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Case Note
Preserving Per Se
United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998).
"[Wie do not have two versions of antitrust law, one for
international transactions and one for domestic: to the extent the
law applies at all, it applies in a nondiscriminatory fashion." 1
In 1995, the Department of Justice indicted Nippon Paper Industries of
Japan for conspiring with other Japanese firms to fix prices on thermal fax
paper sold in the United States, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act.2 In 1997, the First Circuit upheld the indictment,3 becoming
the first court to extend the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act to a
criminal conspiracy formed solely among foreign firms
Yet the First Circuit decision and its subsequent implementation by the
district court did not create a jurisdictional threshold that, once crossed, sets
the typical antitrust prosecution in motion. To the contrary, Nippon Paper
established a new element of the substantive offense-proof of "substantial
effects" -that applies solely in international prosecutions. Not only does
the new doctrine produce different substantive requirements for domestics
and foreigners, it also undermines a half-century of case law holding that,
once a particular restraint of trade is deemed illegal "per se" -as it was in
1. Diane P. Wood, The 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations:
An Introduction, Address Before the ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting (Apr. 5, 1995),
available in 1995 WL 150745, at *2.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("Every contract.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.").
3. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 685 (1998). The district court had dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 944 F. Supp. 55, 66 (D. Mass. 1996) C" Mhe criminal
provisions of the Sherman Act do not apply to conspiratorial conduct in which none of the overt
acts of the conspiracy take place in the United States.").
4. See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 4 (describing "a criminal prosecution for solely
extraterritorial conduct" as "uncharted terrain"). The alleged conspiracy did not merely include
foreign firms but was formed abroad, at a meeting in Japan.
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this case-effects need not be proven to convict.
After providing a brief background of the "per se rule," this Case Note
outlines how courts have undermined the rule through their reluctance to
subject foreigners to its forceful presumptions. The Case Note argues that
the rule should be applied consistently against all defendants. One way to
do this is to separate jurisdiction from substance, thereby allowing courts to
make the jurisdictional determination of effects using presumptions that
both comport with the rule's emphasis on efficiency and follow naturally
from per se doctrine.
I
The First Circuit based its decision in Nippon Paper on Hartford Fire
Insurance v. California,5 a civil antitrust action in which the Supreme Court
held that the Sherman Act applied abroad, provided "foreign conduct...
meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the
United States." 6 The First Circuit extended the jurisdictional authority
further, holding that Hartford Fire applied in the criminal context.7 At trial,
the district court put the question to the jury; but rather than separate the
jurisdictional inquiry from the merits, the court included the jurisdictional
effects requirement in its charge on the elements of the substantive offense!
In July of 1998, the trial ended with a hung jury.
Nippon Paper creates a conflict within criminal antitrust doctrine by
requiring that effects be proven to find a substantive "per se" violation of
the Sherman Act. The case was the first wholly foreign criminal antitrust
action prosecuted under the per se rule, one of the two substantive
frameworks used to decide antitrust cases. Under the other framework, the
rule of reason, the circumstances justifying the restraint are balanced against the
restraint's anticompetitive effects.9 The per se rule, however, precludes
consideration of either the effects of the restraint or the reasons for it.1" The per
se rule is potent because negative effects are presumed. Moreover, it is
5. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
6. Id. at 796. While one might argue that the jurisdictional language in the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) must also be examined, the FTAIA does not apply
to import commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994); see also Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 n.23
(declining to place weight on language in the FTAIA); Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 4 (same).
7. See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 9 (holding that "the Sherman Act applies to wholly foreign
[criminal] conduct which has an intended and substantial effect in the United States").
8. See Record at 2127, 2138, 2199, Nippon Paper (Cr. No. 95-10388-NG). The judge listed a
"number of different ways" to find substantial effects, including whether the volume of
commerce or the share of the market was substantially affected by the conspiracy and whether
competition in the entire market was substantially lessened by the conspiracy. See id. at 2199.
9. See, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (defining
considerations under the rule of reason).
10. See infra text accompanying note 31.
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efficient because that presumption "avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation."' As such, criminal
antitrust prosecutions typically target only per se offenses."2
For more than fifty years, the Supreme Court has held that price-fixing
agreements like that in Nippon Paper are per se illegal, relieving the
government of its burden to prove their effects. 3 The Court, however, also
has indicated that using presumptions to find elements of the crime may be
unconstitutional. 4 Hence the significance of the Nippon Paper charge: By
importing the jurisdictional effects requirement into the elements of the
substantive offense, the court dispossessed the per se rule of its powerful
presumptions.
II
Courts justified undermining the per se rule for foreigners based on
comity principles." The notion that it is somehow unfair to subject
foreigners to U.S. law-even absent a conflict of laws-makes courts
reluctant to use the per se presumptions against them. Nippon Paper
provides one of two bad ways to reach the same bad result.
One way courts have eroded the per se rule for foreigners has been to
try to preserve it through nonuse. Recognizing that an effects requirement is
inconsistent with the per se presumptions, courts before Nippon Paper
refused to apply the rule to foreign criminal conspiracies. Instead, they explicitly
adopted the rule of reason for offenses that, but for the foreign defendant, would
have been prosecuted under the per se framework.16 The result is an asymmetric
doctrine: Foreigners are tried under the far more forgiving rule of reason for the
same offense that subjects U.S. parties to the per se rule.'7
The First Circuit, by contrast, broke new ground in deciding that
Nippon Paper would be prosecuted under the per se standard, not the rule of
11. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643, 646 n.9 (1980).
12. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 2 (1995) [hereinafter GUIDELINES] ("Conduct that the Department
prosecutes criminally is limited to traditional per se offenses of the law, which typically involve
price-fixing, customer allocation, bid-rigging ....").
13. See, e.g., Catalano, 643 U.S. at 650; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150,
224 n.59 (1940).
14. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985) (holding unconstitutional presumptions
related to elements where these presumptions may be understood by the jury as mandatory,
conclusive, or requiring rebuttal); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (same).
15. Cf. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 8 ("[Clomity is a doctrine that counsels voluntary
forbearance when a sovereign which has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction concludes that a second
sovereign also has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction under principles of international law.").
16. See, e.g., Metro Indus. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 843 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Because
conduct occurring outside the United States is only a violation of the Sherman Act if it has a
sufficient negative impact on commerce in the United States, per se analysis is not appropriate.").
17. Cf. Albert A. Foer, The Political-Economic Nature of Antitrust, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 331,
337-38 (1983) (" [Wihen the rule of reason is applied, the defendant virtually always wins.").
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reason.18 The court even recognized the per se presumptions, stating that,
"'conduct regarded as per se illegal"' has "'unquestionably
anticompetitive effects."' "9 The district court, however, precluded the use
of those presumptions by including effects as an essential element, thereby
requiring the government to prove the conspiracy's impact. Nippon Paper's
doctrine thus is not only asymmetric, but internally inconsistent. A per-se-
plus-effects test for only foreigners raises the burden of proof for their
conviction. Moreover, a per se rule that requires proof of effects is not a per
se rule at all; it is a rule of reason and should be acknowledged as such.?'
Either way, the presence of a foreign defendant does not justify
weakening the per se rule. Every indictment of a non-U.S. party follows an
executive branch decision that "the importance of antitrust enforcement
outweighs any relevant foreign policy concerns."'" Once that decision is
made, courts should not undermine it by trying foreigners under weaker
rules. The importance of enforcement particularly outweighs comity
concerns in cases such as Nippon Paper, where foreigners specifically
conspire to harm American consumers.' Indeed, the Sherman Act's
substantive requirement of intent ensures that those convicted knowingly
conspired to restrain U.S. trade. Hartford Fire also holds that comity is not
a factor absent a conflict between domestic and foreign law.Y The First
Circuit recognized that Hartford Fire "stunted" 24 the comity doctrine.
18. See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 7 (holding that "the instant case falls within [the per se]
rubric" and treating it as such).
19. Id (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,440 (1978)).
20. The Department of Justice has stated that, although effects may be relevant ex ante to
establish jurisdiction, on the merits "the standards themselves operate in a non-discriminatory
fashion." Wood, supra note 1, at *4. Yet a per se standard that adds a substantive element to the
offense for foreign offenders only is anything but nondiscriminatory.
21. GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 15; cf idL ("The Department does not believe it is the role
of the courts to second-guess the executive branch's judgment as to the proper role of comity
concerns under these circumstances.").
22. See IA PHLEip AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAmP, ANTITRUST LAW 273c4, at 395
(1997) (opposing extra comity considerations in cases like Hartford Fire, where "foreign insurers,
selling a product in the United States, conspired... to exclude... American firms from the
market-an alleged agreement whose only intended effect would be felt in the United States"). In
Nippon Paper, the government claimed the conspirators specifically fixed a price, in U.S. dollars
($20), for sales in the North American market.
23. See 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993) (noting that the "only substantial question is whether
there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law" and, finding no conflict, holding
that "[w]e have no need.., to address other considerations... on grounds of international
comity" (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). But cf id. at 812-13 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that courts must also consider whether Congress has asserted regulatory
power over the foreign conduct); Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-14
(9th Cir. 1976) (creating a test balancing effects with comity, allowing jurisdiction to be denied
even upon finding effects to be present); 1 SPENSER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 6:10, at 28-29 & nn.4-10 (3d ed. 1997) (noting Timberlane's
acceptance before Hartford Fire).
24. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 8 (" [Comity's] growth in the antitrust sphere has been stunted
by Hartford Fire, in which the Court suggested that comity concerns ... defeat... jurisdiction
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Once courts make the decision to go forward, they should do so
symmetrically. That means either abandoning the per se rule entirely or
using it consistently. The First Circuit rightfully was unwilling to discard
the per se standard; it produces enormous efficiencies, especially for
practices like price-fixing, repeatedly found to harm competition.' The
district court could have preserved the rule by separating the jurisdictional
effects question from the part of the inquiry to which the per se rule actually
applies-the substantive offense of conspiracy to restrain trade. The two
inquiries may, and should, be separated, 6 especially since jurisdiction is a
matter of law.' Determining jurisdiction may require findings of fact, but
courts should set the conditions on how those facts will be applied.' Juries
could then assist in the legal determination without importing substantial
effects into the merits.
Continued use of the per se rule in international criminal antitrust
demands that effects be removed from the elements of the offense. This
would allow courts to use the per se presumptions against all defendants,
rather than creating a new substantive doctrine for foreigners29 Once the
only in those few cases in which the law of the foreign sovereign required a defendant to act in a
manner incompatible with the Sherman Act ... ").
25. While courts recently have been willing to sacrifice the per se rule's efficiencies and use
the rule of reason to uphold typical per se agreements with significant procompetitive effects, see,
e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing, 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985);
Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1979), a similar sacrifice is not
justified in the international context, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
26. As the court held in Gough v. Rossmoor Corp.:
The jurisdictional issue under the Sherman Act is distinct from the substantive
issue.... The jurisdictional question... is whether defendants' conduct had a
sufficient relationship to interstate commerce to be subject to regulation by
Congress .... The substantive issue, on the other hand, is whether defendants
participated in anticompetitive conduct of the kind encompassed within the statutory
terms "restraint of trade." ... When the issue is whether jurisdiction exists, the focus is
upon.. .whether the defendant's conduct-unreasonably restrictive of competition or
not-has a sufficient impact on interstate commerce ....
487 F.2d 373, 375-76 (9th Cir. 1973) (internal citations omitted).
27. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 494 F. Supp 1161, 1176 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (relying upon the "conventional understanding that subject matter jurisdictional
determinations, even where factual findings are involved, are for the court").
28. Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that, as a matter of law, jurisdiction should be decided by
juries applying facts to judge-made presumptions, consistent with the way antitrust law generally
functions. See 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, 321b-c (rev. ed. 1995). Another
benefit of the per se rule is "business certainty." Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 344 (1982). Creating standards under which juries would apply facts to decide the
jurisdictional question would provide more guidance than leaving the determination to individual
juries that, without any such frameworks, would likely reach different verdicts.
29. Removing effects as an element of the offense would allow the government to use
presumptions to prove them. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979). Not every fact
in criminal antitrust cases must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, venue only
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jurisdictional threshold is crossed, there should be only one antitrust law.
A two-part test separating jurisdiction from substance would retain the
jurisdictional inquiry into effects for foreigners while ensuring that all
offenders are treated equally on the merits. Establishing an inference or a
presumption of effects, either from anticompetitive behavior or market
share, seems one of the best ways to preserve the basic rationale underlying
the per se rule.3" A presumption of effects in a jurisdictional inquiry distinct
from the merits follows logically from per se doctrine because "'there are
certain agreements which .... because of their pernicious effect on
competition,. . . are conclusively presumed to be... illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused. . , .  3 In other
words, activities classified as illegal per se are only those presumed to have
a "pernicious effect on competition."
The Court has dealt most extensively with the jurisdictional effects
requirement in cases involving intrastate commerce.32 In those cases, the
need be proved by a preponderance of the evidence because it is not a "true element[]" of the
crime, but rather "merely a fact." U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Pattern
Instructions, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS § 3.07 cmt., at 6-75 (1991) [hereinafter Pattern Instructions]; see
EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 28.03, at 61 (Supp.
1998). None of the pattern jury instructions I have found include jurisdiction as an essential
element of a section 1 offense. See, e.g., id. § 51A.15 (including only two elements that need be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (I) that the conspiracy was formed and (2) that the defendant
intended to join the agreement-an instruction cited by the Supreme Court as the kind "generally
given in similar antitrust cases." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 463
(1978)).
30. I do not distinguish between inferences and presumptions. However, a permissive
inference of effects may be more attractive, both because it is less forceful and because the Court
has indicated that an essential element of the offense may be proved through such an inference.
Cf Francis v. Frankldin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985) ("A permissive inference suggests to the jury a
possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves certain predicate facts, but does not require the
jury to draw that conclusion.... Such inferences do not necessarily implicate the concerns of
Sandstrom [i.e., prohibiting use of presumptions for essential elements]."). Thus, even if effects
remain an essential element, a permissive inference might still be applicable.
This issue clearly merits more consideration. Another option might be requiring that effects
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The emphasis on the probability of effects seems
more aligned with a more-likely-than-not test than with a reasonable doubt standard. See, e.g.,
Posters 'N' Things v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 523 (1994) ("'[A]ction undertaken with
knowledge of its probable consequences. . . can be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal
liability under the antitrust laws."' (quoting Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 444)). Preponderance is already
used in antitrust prosecutions for nonessential elements, such as venue. See Pattern Instructions,
supra note 29.
31. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643, 646 n.9 (1980) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)); cf Summit Health v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 331 (1991)
("In cases involving horizontal agreements to fix prices.... we have based jurisdiction on a
general conclusion that the.., agreement 'almost surely' had a marketwide impact and therefore
an effect on interstate commerce." (internal citation omitted)).
32. The substantial effects requirement for jurisdiction typically applies to both intrastate as
well as foreign conspiracies, since neither are literally within interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980) (holding that the law
extends "beyond activities actually in interstate commerce to reach other activities that, while
wholly local in nature, nevertheless substantially affect interstate commerce").
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Court indeed has relied on the per se presumptions to find effects. In Burke
v. Ford, the Court held: "[T]erritorial divisions almost invariably reduce
competition .... Thus, the [intrastate] market division inevitably affected
interstate commerce." 33  From a presumption about the probable
anticompetitive effects of a conspiracy outside interstate commerce came a
conclusion that actual effects on interstate commerce were "inevitable."
Later construing that case, the Court held that the conspiracy "substantially
affected interstate commerce because as a matter of practical economics
that division could be expected to reduce significantly the magnitude of
purchases made." ' "Practical economics" is important because practical
economics underlie the entire per se doctrine. The per se presumptions are
based on the notion that those agreements considered illegal per se are such
that practical economics dictates that pernicious effects follow. Just as the
Court has held that practical economics renders unnecessary an inquiry into
effects, it also has indicated that the same standard allows a presumption of
effects when such effects must be proved.
This presumption may be too hard on some foreign firms. It does not
make sense to haul into U.S. court and charge firms that have exported little
or nothing to the United States with conspiracy to restrain U.S. trade. Aside
from the fact that the Department of Justice will not waste its time
prosecuting them, such cases could be filtered out if effects are only
presumable provided the defendant has sufficient business in interstate
commerce. The Court has used this method. In fact, under this type of
inquiry, the Court has presumed substantial effects even more quickly than
the "anticompetitive effects" that automatically follow a per se offense:
[P]etitioners [may] demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate
commerce generated by respondents' brokerage activity. Petitioners
need not make the more particularized showing of an
effect... caused by the alleged conspiracy .... If establishing
jurisdiction required a showing that the unlawful conduct itself had
an effect on interstate commerce, jurisdiction would be defeated by
a demonstration that the alleged restraint failed to have its intended
anticompetitive effect. This is not the rule of our cases.35
With substantial business in interstate commerce, effects are presumed
if the conspiracy is proved. One court justified applying this standard
because, "in a price-fixing case .... the government does not have 'the
burden of ascertaining from day to day... economic conditions."'
3 6
33. 389 U.S. 320, 321-22 (1967).
34. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738,745 (1976).
35. McLain, 444 U.S. at 242-43.
36. See United States v. Hayter Oil, 51 F.3d 1265, 1273 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
relevant inquiry is the general volume of commerce, not those transactions specifically targeted by
1999] 919
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Consistent with the per se rule's rejection of detailed case-by-case review,
general market share is far more easily ascertainable than are the specific
effects of a conspiracy. Such an inquiry also satisfies comity concerns by
ensuring a nexus with U.S. commerce sufficient to presume that a
conspiracy would have some effect. Indeed, the Nippon Paper concurrence
presumed effects from general activity: "NPI sold $6.1 million of fax paper
into the United States.... NPI's price increases thus affected a not
insignificant share of the United States market."37 Notably, market
participation has nothing to do with the substantive violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. That substantial effects still may be found from such
participation supports removing them from the elements of the offense?'
According to the Department of Justice, "once you're in the door...
the same substantive rules apply to all cases.... [The framework for
analysis will not shift just because a case has international elements." 39
Nippon Paper did shift that framework. A better way to advance
international criminal antitrust enforcement is to decide the jurisdictional
question by presuming substantial effects from the defendant's general
market participation. Thereafter, as in any other per se prosecution, the anti-
competitive effects of the conspiracy are assumed for the purposes of the
substantive inquiry. Such a two-part test not only respects comity principles
by ensuring that the foreign defendant is significantly involved in U.S.
commerce, but it precludes the need for detailed inquiry into the
conspiracy's specific effects-an inquiry that the per se doctrine explicitly
rejects. By separating the jurisdictional question, the decision on the merits
remains the same for all parties, while the jurisdictional standard is met
through a presumptive framework that preserves doctrinal consistency by
reasoning from the same principles that underlie the per se rule.
-Abbe Gluck
the conspiracy (internal citation omitted)); see also Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America, 749
F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that, since the company's business "represent[ed] only
an insignificant part" of the U.S. market, "[tihe actual effect of Timberlane's potential operations
on United States foreign commerce is, therefore, insubstantial").
37. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 12 (Lynch, J., concurring).
38. A more stringent application of the presumption would return to the standard enunciated
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), one of the
earliest cases on the Sherman Act's extraterritorial reach. Under Alcoa, if the Government proved
intent, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove the expected effect did not occur. See id. at
444. Burden-shifting was appropriate because, once "the parties took the trouble specifically" to
enter into the conspiracy, "there is reason to suppose that they expected that it would have some
effect." Id. This is just practical economics in another form. Notably, burden-shifting occurs in
other areas of antitrust law. See, e.g., Hayter Oil, 51 F.3d at 1270-71 (shifting the burden to the
defendant to prove the conspiracy was abandoned once the government proved it existed).
39. Wood, supra note 1, at *4.
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